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Abstract
Whether or not cooperation is favored in evolutionary games on graphs depends on the population
structure and spatial properties of the interaction network. The population structure can be expressed
as configurations. Such configurations extend scenarios with a single cooperator among defectors to any
number of cooperators and any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the network. For interaction
networks modeled as regular graphs and for weak selection, the emergence of cooperation can be assessed
by structure coefficients, which can be specified for each configuration and each regular graph. Thus, as a
single cooperator can be interpreted as a lone mutant, the configuration–based structure coefficients also
describe fixation properties of multiple mutants. We analyze the structure coefficients and particularly
show that under certain conditions the coefficients strongly correlate to the average shortest path length
between cooperators on the evolutionary graph. Thus, for multiple cooperators fixation properties on
regular evolutionary graphs can be linked to cooperator path lengths.
1 Introduction
A central issue in evolutionary game theory is describing conditions for the emergence of cooperation [7, 27].
For games on evolutionary graphs with a single cooperator, the question of whether or not cooperation is
favored over defection is generally settled for weak selection. The answer is given for regular graphs by a
single quantity, the structure coefficients [1, 30, 40, 41], while for graphs in general a quantity related to
coalescence times can be used [2]. If there are multiple cooperators, the situation is more complicated [18, 34].
Recently, an approach has been proposed that analyses a given number of cooperators and defectors on
the evolutionary graph as configurations describing any possible arrangement of strategies over players
[10, 11, 36, 37]. The approach also defines structure coefficients applicable for each configuration and for
each network of interaction modeled by regular graphs [11].
Game dynamics with multiple cooperators may be interesting for at least two reasons. A frequently
studied question is the appearance of a single cooperator by mutation that may or may not fixate in a
frequency–dependent strategy updating process [8, 10, 30, 25, 33, 40, 41]. If, starting from a single cooperator
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configuration, fixation of cooperation succeeds, then the evolutionary process may undergo a transition
through configurations with multiple cooperators. Thus, studying multiple cooperator configurations can
be seen as an attempt to describe how the transition process creates evolutionary trajectories. Moreover, in
social networks, it may be interesting to actively design conditions positive for cooperation. Such a design
could involve the strategic placement of more than one cooperator to enhance the likelihood that cooperation
prevails.
In this paper results are presented suggesting that for regular graphs fixation properties for any number of
cooperators are strongly correlated to the cooperator path length, which is the average shortest path length
between cooperators on the evolutionary graph. In other words, we can link a property of the evolutionary
game (emergence of cooperation) to a property of the graph (a certain path length). Moreover, it can be
observed that particularly large values of the structure coefficient can be found for the cooperators clustering
on cycles of the interaction graph. This result implies that clustering is certainly helpful for cooperation
to succeed and suggests the conjecture that graphs with abundant and overlapping cycles of length up to
the number of cooperators produce more favorable structure coefficients than graphs with few or separate
cycles. We also discuss that these results are most important for small and intermediate numbers of players
as the variance of structure coefficients over configurations ceases for the number of players getting large.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. 2 the methodological framework of configuration–based
structure coefficients is briefly recalled, see [11, 37] for a more detailed description. The main results are given
in Sec. 3, where we analyze and compare evolutionary graphs covering a wide range of graph–theoretical
properties. It is shown how structure coefficients are distributed over configurations with the same number
of cooperators and how structure coefficients correlate to cooperator path lengths. These relationships
between fixation properties and cooperator path lengths relate to previous results for evolutionary games on
lattice grids that show clusters of cooperators have better chances to survive [16, 17, 22, 32]. The findings
are supported by results for networks with a varying number of players and coplayers. Finally, the results
are discussed and conclusions are drawn about finding or designing best conditions to favor cooperation in
evolutionary games on regular graphs.
2 Methods
We consider coevolutionary games with N players I = (I1, I2, . . . , IN ). Each pairwise interaction between 2
of these players, Ii and Ij , who thus are mutual coplayers, provides them with a payoff depending on which
of 2 strategies, Ci or Di and Cj or Dj , each player uses. Each player has k coplayers with 2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1.
A (possibly varying) network structure defines which player interacts with whom. Such games are specified
by (i.) the payoff matrix, (ii.) the interaction network, and (iii.) the configuration of the game [11, 36]. The
2× 2 payoff matrix is (Cj Dj
Ci a b
Di c d
)
. (1)
The interaction network is represented by an evolutionary graph. Each player Ii belongs to a vertex i and
an edge connecting vertex i and vertex j shows that the players Ii and Ij are mutual coplayers [2, 39].
Such an interaction graph is equivalent to the adjacency matrix AI ∈ [0, 1]N×N . Set the element aij of AI
to aij = 1 for an edge between vertex i and vertex j, and let aij = 0 indicate that the players Ii and Ij
are not coplayers. We consider coevolutionary games with no self–play where each player Ii has the same
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number k of coplayers. Thus, the interaction graph is a simple k–regular graph. Finally, a configuration
pi = (pi1pi2 . . . piN ) specifies the strategy pii ∈ {Ci, Di} that each player Ii, (i = 1, 2, . . . , N), uses. With 2
strategies (Ci and Di) there are 2
N configurations. These configurations enumerate all possible arrangements
of cooperators and defectors among the players. Additionally, the configurations describe any outcome of a
player changing its strategy in a strategy updating process, for instance death–birth (DB) or birth–death
(BD) updating [1, 33, 39]. It is convenient to binary code the strategies {Ci, Di} → {1, 0}, thus having a
binary string to specify the strategies of all players [11, 36]. Consider the example of N = 4 players. There
are 24 = 16 configurations. For instance, the configuration pi = (pi1pi2pi3pi4) = (0110) shows that players I2
and I3 cooperate, while I1 and I4 defect. As cooperation is coded as Ci = 1, the Hamming weight of the
string pi (the count of 1–elements in pi) gives the number of cooperators c(pi) of a configuration pi. Thus,
pi = (0110) has c(0110) = 2 cooperators. For 1 ≤ c(pi) ≤ N − 1, there is more than one configuration pi
for the same number of cooperators c(pi). For instance, there are N configurations for a single cooperator
(c(pi) = 1). The number #c(pi) of configurations with the same number of cooperators c(pi) can be calculated
by:
#c(pi) =
(
N
c(pi)
)
(2)
with 1 ≤ c(pi) ≤ N − 1 and ∑N−1c(pi)=1 #c(pi) = 2N − 2.
Recently, it was shown by Chen et al. [11] that for 2 × 2 games with N players, payoff matrix (1),
any configuration pi of cooperators and defectors and for any interaction network modeled by a simple,
connected, k–regular graph, in the case of weak selection strategy Ci is favored over Di if
σ(pi)(a− d) > (c− b). (3)
We call the quantity σ(pi) the structure coefficient of the configuration pi implying that it may have different
values for different arrangements of cooperators and defectors decribed by pi. The condition (3) generalizes
the same condition with σ(pi) = σ = (k+1)N−4k(k−1)N , which applies to a single cooperator, and is independent of
where on the network the single cooperator is initally located [23, 29, 40, 41]. Furthermore, is was shown that
for weak selection, the matrix AI describing the replacement structure, and DB as well as BD updating, the
structure coefficient σ(pi) can be calculated with time complexity O(k2N). In particular, for DB updating
we have
σ(pi) =
N (1 + 1/k)ω1 · ω0 − 2ω10 − ω1ω0
N (1− 1/k)ω1 · ω0 + ω1ω0 , (4)
with 4 local frequencies: ω1, ω0, ω10 and ω1ω0, see [11]. For these local frequencies, the following probabilistic
interpretation has been suggested. Suppose on a given interaction network a random walk is carried out with
the starting vertex chosen uniformly–at–random. The local frequency ω1 (or ω0 = 1−ω1) is the probability
that for a configuration pi the player at the first step of the walk is a cooperator (or defector). The local
frequency ω10 is the probability that for a walk with 2 steps the player at the first step is a cooperator and
at the second step it is a defector. Finally, if we carry out 2 random walks independent of each other, the
local frequency ω1ω0 is the probability that the player at the first step on the first walk is a cooperator, but
a defector at the first step on the second walk.
To define the cooperator path length lc we call dij(Ii, Ij) the shortest path on the evolutionary graph
between vertex i (= player Ii) and vertex j (= player Ij) given that both players are cooperators: pii =
pij = 1. The quantity dij(Ii, Ij) can be calculated by variants of Dijkstra’s algorithm with time complexity
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(a) σ(pi) = σmax = 1.6897, la = 1
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(c) σ(pi) = σmax = 1.6539, la = 4/3
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Figure 1: Configurations pi, structure coefficients σ(pi) and cooperator path lengths lc for: (a) the Frucht [11, 14, 24],
(b) the truncated tetrahedral [35] and (c) the Franklin graph [12]. The truncated tetrahedral and the Franklin graph
are vertex–transitive, while the Frucht graph is not, but possesses no non–trivial automorphism. All these graphs are
Hamiltonian. Configurations with the maximal structure coefficient σmax are shown for: (a),(b) c(pi) = 3 cooperators;
(c) c(pi) = 4 cooperators.
O(kN/2 +N log (N)). If there are more than 2 cooperators, c(pi) > 2, there are c(pi)(c(pi)− 1))/2 > 1 pairs
with individual path lengths dij(Ii, Ij). The cooperator path length lc is the mean over all pairs:
lc =
2
c(pi)(c(pi)− 1)
∑
i,j
i6=j
di,j(Ii, Ij). (5)
3 Results
Studying relationships between configurations pi, structure coefficients σ(pi) and cooperator path lengths lc
starts with 6 different interaction networks with N = 12 players and k = 3 coplayers that represent a variety
of graph properties, see Tab. 1 and Figs. 1–2, and also the Appendix 1 with Figs. 7–10. We analyze the
following graphs: Frucht [11, 14, 24], truncated tetrahedral [35], Franklin [12], Tietze [6, 24], Du¨rer and
Mo¨bius ladder [35].
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Table 1: Analysis of the structure coefficients σ(pi) and the cooperator path lengths lc for varying numbers of
cooperators 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ 6 and different graphs of size N = 12 and degree k = 3. The table shows the multiplicity
of the structure coefficient #σ, the maximal and minimal structure coefficient, σmax and σmin, the multiplicity of
the maximal and minimal structure coefficient, #σmax and #σmin and the multiplicity of the cooperator path length,
#lc min and #lc max . Note that the number of configurations with the same number of cooperators are #c(pi) =
(#2,#3,#4,#5,#6) = (66, 220, 495, 792, 924), which is calculated by the binomials #c(pi) =
12!
c(pi)!(12−c(pi))! , see Eq.
(2). The truncated tetrahedral graph, the Franklin graphs and the Mo¨bius ladder graph are vertex–transitive. The
multiplicities #σmax , #σmin , #lc min and #lc max are underlined if they match, which means #σmax = #lc min and
#σmin = #lc max and implies the largest value of the structure coefficient σ(pi) is uniquely determined by the smallest
value of the cooperator path length lc, and vice versa. Furthermore, the results for the structure coefficients σ(pi)
are symmetric with respect to the number of cooperators, compare to Fig. 3 (a),(b). This means the values for
#σ, σmax, σmin, #σmax and #σmin are the same for c(pi) = {5, 7}, c(pi) = {4, 8}, c(pi) = {3, 9} and so on. For the
vertex–transitive graphs this symmetry also applies for #lc min and #lc max .
Graph Triangles Squares c(pi) #σ σmax σmin #σmax #σmin #lc min #lc max
Frucht
Fig. 1(a)
2 5 1.5846 1.4546 9 23 18 2
3 14 1.6897 1.4000 3 1 3 2
3 1 4 20 1.7059 1.4231 2 23 10 4
5 24 1.7568 1.4210 1 19 1 5
6 25 1.7130 1.4202 6 24 3 3
Truncated
tetrahedral
Fig. 1(b)
2 4 1.5846 1.4546 12 24 18 24
3 10 1.6897 1.4000 4 4 4 4
4 0 4 12 1.6796 1.4231 12 30 12 24
5 15 1.6549 1.4210 36 24 12 12
6 18 1.6897 1.4000 6 6 38 6
Franklin
Fig. 1(c)
2 4 1.5455 1.4546 18 18 18 18
3 8 1.5909 1.4270 12 24 36 36
0 3 4 13 1.6539 1.4231 3 15 3 3
5 17 1.6316 1.4210 12 12 12 12
6 18 1.6379 1.4000 6 8 6 6
Tietze
Fig. 2(a)
2 4 1.5846 1.4546 3 15 18 15
3 11 1.6897 1.4000 1 1 1 1
1 0 4 14 1.6796 1.4231 3 12 3 3
5 20 1.6549 1.4210 3 12 6 18
6 18 1.6154 1.4202 26 24 13 14
Du¨rer
Fig. 2(b)
2 4 1.5846 1.4546 6 18 18 3
3 10 1.6897 1.4270 2 12 2 42
2 0 4 16 1.6796 1.4231 6 24 6 3
5 20 1.6786 1.4210 6 18 12 36
6 19 1.6897 1.4310 6 36 8 1
Mo¨bius
ladder
Fig. 2(c)
2 4 1.5455 1.4546 18 24 18 24
3 9 1.5909 1.4000 24 4 36 4
0 6 4 17 1.6539 1.4340 6 48 6 48
5 20 1.6549 1.4310 24 60 24 24
6 20 1.6897 1.4000 6 6 6 4
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Of these graphs, 3 are just regular, but differ by having no non–trivial symmetry (Frucht), possess-
ing non–trivial automorphisms and being Hamiltonian (Du¨rer) or not (Tietze). The other 3 graphs are
vertex–transitive, which is to say that some automorphism group acts transitively upon the graph’s vertices.
Informally speaking, vertex–transitive means the graphs look the same from any two vertices and thus have
a higher degree of symmetry than graphs that are just regular. Additionally, the truncated tetrahedral,
Tietze and Du¨rer graph have triangles (cycles of length 3), but are square free, while the Franklin and
Mo¨bius ladder graphs have squares (cycles of length 4), but are triangle free.
For these graphs large values of the structure coefficients σ(pi) correspond to small values of the cooperator
path length lc, and vice versa, suggesting the hypothesis that between the structure coefficients σ(pi) and
the cooperator path length lc there is an inversely proportional relationship. For example, the Frucht graph
with 3 cooperators has the maximal structure coefficient σmax = 1.6897 for 3 configurations which all share
that the 3 cooperators are distanced by the minimal lc = 1 and belong to one of the 3 triangles of the Frucht
graph, see Fig. 1(a) which shows one of these configurations. The same applies for 3 cooperators and the
truncated tetrahedral graph, Fig. 1(b), while with 4 cooperators and the Franklin graph, Fig. 1(c), we get
3 configurations with σmax = 1.6539 and the minimal lc = 4/3. A more detailed analysis of configurations
pi, structure coefficients σ(pi) and cooperator path lengths lc for these interaction networks is given in the
Appendix 1 with Figs. 7–10. Particularly, it is shown that for 4 cooperators, the largest or smallest value
of lc in itself does not guarantee the smallest or largest value of σ(pi). For instance, for the Franklin graph
and 4 cooperators, c(pi) = 4, not only the smallest value lc = 4/3, but also that the 4 cooperators form
one of the squares, gives the largest structure coefficient σmax = 1.6539, Fig. 1(c), while for the truncated
tetrahedral graph, the minimal σmin = 1.4231 is obtained for the second largest value lc = 3, Fig. 10(e). It
can further be observed that the maximal and minimal value of σ(pi) is rarely unique for a configuration pi,
even if the number of cooperators c(pi) is constant.
In Tab. 1, the largest and smallest σ(pi), denoted as σmax and σmin, are given for each 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ 6.
The table also shows the multiplicity of the structure coefficients #σ, and the multiplicity of the maximal
and minimal structure coefficient, #σmax and #σmin as well as the multiplicity of the maximal and minimal
cooperator path length, la max and la min. The multiplicity of the structure coefficient #σ is the number
of different values of σ(pi). For instance, for the Frucht graph and c(pi) = 6, #σ = 25 means there are 25
different values of σ(pi) over the #6 = 924 configurations with 6 cooperators. Similarly, the multiplicity
of the maximal structure coefficient #σmax is the number of configurations that have σ(pi) = σmax. Thus,
for the Franklin graph and c(pi) = 5, #σmax = 12 means 12 out of 792 configurations have the maximal
structure coefficient σmax = 1.6316. For #σmin , #lc min and #lc max this applies likewise.
Looking at the results in Tab. 1, we see some patterns over the 6 graphs considered, but also some
differences. A first pattern is that the multiplicity of the structure coefficients #σ does not scale to the
number of configurations #c(pi) for each number of cooperators c(pi). Clearly, for c(pi) = 2 and #2 = 66
configurations with 2 cooperators, we also get the smallest #σ in all cases given in Tab. 1, but as c(pi)
and #c(pi) increases, the multiplicity of the structure coefficient #σ does not. The same property can
also be found for the multiplicity of maximal and minimal σ(pi) and lc. Another interesting result is that
generally the multiplicity of the minimal σmin is larger than for the maximal σmax, that is, mostly we have
#σmax ≤ #σmin . A possible interpretation is that finding a configuration pi at random with the maximal
structure coefficient σmax is less likely than finding a configuration with σmin. However, this interpretation
should be viewed with respect to the number of configurations with the same number of cooperator #c(pi).
For instance, for the Frucht graph, we get for 2 cooperators (c(pi) = 2) the values #σmax = 9 and #σmin = 23.
With #2 = 66 configurations with 2 cooperators, the likelihood to find at random a configuration with σmax
6
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(a) σ(pi) = σmax = 1.6549, lc = 8/5
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(c) σ(pi) = σmax = 1.6897, lc = 5/3
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Figure 2: Configurations pi, structure coefficients σ(pi) and cooperator path lengths lc for: (a) the Tietze, (b) the
Du¨rer and (c) the Mo¨bius ladder graph, [6, 35]. The Mo¨bius ladder graph is vertex–transitive, while the Tietze and the
Du¨rer graph are not, but both possess non–trivial automorphisms. The Du¨rer graph is Hamiltonian, while the Tietze
graph is not. Configurations with the maximal structure coefficient σmax are shown for: (a),(b) c(pi) = 5 cooperators;
(c) c(pi) = 6 cooperators.
is 9/66 = 0.1364, while for σmin it is 23/66 = 0.3485. However, if we consider the same for 6 cooperators,
we get 6/924 = 0.0065 and 24/924 = 0.0260 for σmax and σmin. In other words, looking at random for
configurations with certain fixation properties might be promising for a small number of cooperators, but
surely it is not for a larger c(pi).
Comparing the graphs the most interesting result is that for the vertex–transitive graphs (truncated
tetrahedral, Franklin and Mo¨bius ladder) the multiplicity of σmax and σmin matches the multiplicity of
la min and la max more often than for the other graphs, see Tab. 1, where in the columns for #σmax ,
#σmin , #lc min and #lc max the matching values are underlined. This means for the vertex–transitive graphs
considered it is more likely that the largest value of the structure coefficient σ(pi) is uniquely determined by
the smallest value of the cooperator path length lc, and vice versa. While for the Frucht, Tietze and Du¨rer
graph, there are 2, 4 and 2 matches, we get for the tetrahedral, Franklin and Mo¨bius ladder graph 5, 6 and
7 matches. Thus, we can hypothesize that for vertex–transitive graphs the correlation between structure
coefficients and cooperator path lengths might be stronger than for graphs that are just regular. The next
set of numerical results deals with this hypothesis and generally with the proposed inverse proportional
relationships between structure coefficients and cooperator path lengths.
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Figure 3: Distributions of the structure coefficients σ(pi) for the Frucht graph (a),(c) and the Franklin graph
(b),(d) over the number of cooperators c(pi) (a),(b) and unique values of the cooperator path length lc for
c(pi) = 6 (c),(d). The blue lines intersecting the distributions show the value σ = 1.5 which is obtained for a
single cooperator with N = 12, k = 3 and σ = (k+1)N−4k(k−1)N . The green lines indicate the condition σ(pi) > 5/3
to favor cooperation in a PD game with
(
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)
= ( 4 05 1 ).
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(a) Frucht graph, Fig. 1(a)
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(b) Truncated tetrahedral graph, Fig. 1(b)
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(c) Franklin graph, Fig. 1(c)
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(d) Tietze graph, Fig. 2(a)
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(e) Du¨rer graph, Fig. 2(b)
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(f) Mo¨bius ladder graph, Fig. 2(c)
Figure 4: Distribution of the structure coefficients σ(pi) as violin plots over unique values of the cooperator
path length lc for each number of cooperators 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ 10.
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Figure 5: Correlation coefficients measuring how well the relationship between structure coefficients σ(pi)
and cooperator path lengths lc can be described over the number of cooperators c(pi). (a) Pearson product–
moment correlation coefficient r giving a measure on a linear function. (b) Spearman rank correlation
coefficient ρ giving a measure on a monotonic function.
As shown above for different evolutionary graphs, the values of σ(pi) (including the largest and smallest,
but also intermediate values) form a discrete distribution with #σ different values. In other words, for every
configuration pi we have a structure coefficient σ(pi) and a cooperator path length lc. As the configurations
can be classified according to the number of cooperators c(pi), we may study how the structure coefficients
are distributed over c(pi) and also over the range of the cooperator path length lc, see Figs. 3–4. The
distributions are depicted as histograms and shown as violin plots. The number of bins of the histograms is
calculated according to the Freedman–Diaconis rule [13, 38], which is designed to minimize the error made
by the partition. The central axis of each violin plot gives the range between largest and smallest value of
σ(pi).
Fig. 3 shows some findings supporting the main results given with Fig. 4 by considering the Frucht graph
and the Franklin graph. In the upper panels, Fig. 3 (a),(b), the distributions of the structure coefficients
σ(pi) are given for each number of cooperators, 1 ≤ c(pi) ≤ 11, while the lower panels, Fig. 3 (c),(d), take
the example of 6 cooperators (c(pi) = 6) and depict the distributions for each unique value of the cooperator
path length lc. The results for the distribution of σ(pi) over the number of cooperators c(pi), Fig. 3 (a),(b),
show some characteristics that can similarly be found for other graphs as well. A first characteristics is that
the distributions are symmetric with respect to the number of cooperators c(pi). A second is that for a single
cooperator (or defector), c(pi) = 1 or c(pi) = N − 1 = 11, there is the same single value of the structure
coefficient for all N = 12 configurations, see the blue line in Fig. 3. With N = 12 and k = 3 this value
reproduces the well–known result σ = (k+1)N−4k(k−1)N = 3/2, compare with [23, 29, 40, 41]. For 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ 10
cooperators we obtain structure coefficients σ(pi) that are both larger and smaller than σ = 1.5, depending
on the arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the graph, see Figs. 1 and 2 as well as the discussion in
the Appendix 1. Put differently, for multiple cooperators the arrangement of cooperators and defectors on
the evolutionary graph may substantially affect whether or not cooperation is favored, even if the number
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of cooperators is the same. Generally, the largest range between maximal and minimal value of σ(pi) is not
reached for c(pi) = N/2 but for c(pi) = N/2± 1 or c(pi) = N/2± 2.
The distribution of σ(pi) over c(pi) for the Frucht graph, Fig. 3(a), and the Franklin graph, Fig. 3(b),
are rather similar with the range between maximal and minimal value of σ(pi) slightly larger for the Frucht
graph. However, comparing the results with respect to how the structure coefficients σ(pi) are distributed
over unique values of the cooperator path length lc shows substantial differences between the graphs, see Fig.
3(c),(d). Not only is the range of lc smaller for Franklin (1.73 ≤ lc ≤ 2.27) than for Frucht (1.60 ≤ lc ≤ 2.40),
there are also fewer unique values (#lc = 9 vs. #lc = 13). Also, the range between σmax and σmin for each lc
is smaller for Franklin than for Frucht. For other numbers of cooperators, and the other interaction graphs
considered, we find similar results. This applies in particular to the general result that large values of σ(pi)
coincide very frequently with small values of lc, and vice versa. To visualize how the histograms scale over
the number of cooperators, Fig. 4 aggregates the violin plots over c(pi). Each violin is colored according to a
color code for each c(pi), and on the axis below and above the graph the maximum and the minimum value
of lc is given for each c(pi). By looking at this visual presentation of the relationships between structure
coefficients c(pi) and cooperator path lengths lc several observations can be made. The first is that for
small and medium numbers of cooperators 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ 6 we see for all 6 graphs a clear reverse proportional
relationship between c(pi) and lc. For the vertex–transitive graphs this remains for 6 ≤ c(pi) ≤ 10. Moreover,
for these graphs the distribution of σ(pi) for each value of lc shows a certain symmetry with respect to the
number of cooperators. This is not true for the other 3 graphs. Given the fact that the whole distribution
of σ(pi) over c(pi) is symmetric, see Fig. 3(a),(b), this symmetry found for the 3 vertex–transitive graphs is
caused by the cooperator path length lc showing certain symmetry properties.
Compare the multiplicity #lc of lc. For instance, for the Franklin graphs we get the multiplicities of lc as
#lc = {3, 3, 9, 5, 9, 5, 9, 3, 3} for the number of cooperators c(pi) = {2, 3, 4, . . . , 9, 10}. As for the number of
cooperators c(pi) and the number of defectors d(pi) there is c(pi) + d(pi) = N , the multiplicities #lc for c(pi)
matches that of N − c(pi). By contrast, for the Frucht graph we get #lc = {4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 13, 11, 8}, which
does not show this kind of symmetry. However, note that this symmetry does not mean that for each c(pi)
and N−c(pi) we obtain the same values of the cooperator path length lc. For instance, for the Franklin graph
with c(pi) = 2 we have the values lc = {1, 2, 3}, while for c(pi) = 10 the values are lc = {1.98, 2.00, 2.02}. We
have the same number of unique values but their range shrinks for c(pi) increasing. This appears plausible
as for a small number of cooperators, for instance c(pi) = 2, the cooperator path length can be as high as
the diameter of the graph, while for larger c(pi) the growing number of cooperators crowds the graph and
makes average distances smaller. This symmetry property of the distribution of #lc over c(pi), which can
be found for the other 2 vertex transitives graphs as well, is related to the property that vertex transitivity
implies the graph to be strongly distance balanced [19, 20, 21].
We next analyze the relationships visualized in Fig. 4 by considering correlation coefficients. Fig. 5
shows the Pearson product–moment correlation coefficient r and the Spearman rank correlation coefficient
ρ, each between the variables σ(pi) and lc. Pearson’s r gives a measure of how well the relationship between
the variables can be described by a linear function, Fig. 5(a), while Spearman’s ρ is a measure of how
well the relationship matches a monotonic function, Fig. 5(b). We notice that for small c(pi) we obtain
for both correlation coefficients and all 6 graphs values slightly bigger than −1, which indicates a strong
inverse proportional relationship. For the 3 vertex–transitive graphs this strong correlation remains for all
c(pi), while for the 3 graphs that are just regular, the correlation weakens while c(pi) increases. Comparing
the two correlation coefficients shows that the relationships are better approximated by a linear than by a
monotonic function.
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Figure 6: Pearson product–moment correlation coefficient r measuring how well the relationships between
structure coefficients σ(pi) and cooperator path lengths lc can be described by linear functions over the
number of cooperators c(pi) for N = {10, 14, 20, 26} players and all 2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 coplayers.
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We close with a brief study of how the correlation between σ(pi) and lc behaves for other N and k.
Therefore, we analyze coevolutionary games with N = {10, 14, 20, 26} players, each for all 2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1
coplayers. Interaction networks are modeled as regular graphs, whose adjacency matrices AI are generated
algorithmically [4, 5]. We discard graphs that are not connected and vertex–transitive, which is based
on analyzing the Fiedler eigenvalue (the second–smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix kI − AI) for
connectivity [9], and symmetry properties of transition matrices describing random walks on AI with Markov
chain characteristics for vertex transitivity [42]. For each N and k, we use a set of 1000 different graphs.
For N = {10, 14}, all 2N configurations are analyzed. As analyzing all configurations could not be realized
with the computational resources available in this study for N = {20, 26}, we sampled 25.000 configurations
uniformly at random out of the whole set. Auxiliary results with different samples have shown that the
error made in calculating the correlations by such a sampling is very small, which is plausible as there is an
increasing number of configurations with the same σ(pi) and lc. Fig. 6 shows the correlations expressed as
Pearson’s r, which are averages over all 1000 graphs. We see that the results generally support the claims
made for the 6 graphs with N = 12 and k = 3. Particularity for 3 ≤ k ≤ N/2 coplayers the curves resemble
those for the Frucht, the Du¨rer and the Tietze graph, see Fig. 5(a). For k = 2 (cycle graphs), the strength
of correlation increases with increasing c(pi) (except for N = 26), while for k ≥ N/2 the correlations remain
strong for an increasing number of cooperators, similar to the results for the vertex–transitive graphs. The
results in Fig. 6 suggest that the correlations reported are not specific for the 6 graphs listed in Tab. 1, but
apply more generally. Further works could study if this is also the case for N > 26 players.
4 Discussion
Whether or not cooperation is favored over defection in an evolutionary game on k–regular graphs with
N vertices (= players) can be assigned in the case of weak selection by the structure coefficient σ(pi) for
any arrangement of cooperators and defectors described by a configuration pi [11, 37]. As the emergence of
cooperation is always opposed for BD updating, the focus here was on the apparently more interesting case
of DB updating. For DB updating, σ(pi) can be calculated with polynomial time complexity by Eq. (4). It
was illustrated using the example of 6 different interaction networks modeled as regular graphs that for 2
cooperators (and up to N − 2 cooperators), the structure coefficients may vary over configurations, even if
the number of cooperators is the same. Thus, if we interpret a single cooperator among defectors as a lone
mutant, the results reported apply to configurations of multiple mutants as well. Furthermore, numerical
results were given suggesting that the structure coefficients σ(pi) can be linked to the cooperator path length
lc by an inverse linear relationship. Additional results with a multitude of interaction graphs algorithmically
generated with N = {10, 14, 20, 26} players and 2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 coplayers confirm these findings. As this
implies large values of σ(pi) for low cooperator path lengths lc, and vice versa, the result provides another
rationale for clusters of cooperators giving different fixation properties than cooperators that are sparsely
distributed on the evolutionary graph. For evolutionary games on lattice grids clusters of cooperators have
better chances to survive [16, 17, 22, 32]. Lattice grids can be understood as 4–regular graphs for Von
Neumann neighborhoods and as 8–regular graphs for Moore neighborhoods. Clusters of cooperators have
smaller cooperator path lengths than cooperators that are isolated. Thus, the results for lattice grids are
consistent with (and a special case of) the findings for k–regular graphs given here.
The approach presented in this paper gives a methodology for analyzing how properties of interaction
networks relate to arrangements of more than one cooperator and subsequently to fixation properties of the
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evolutionary game specified by the graph. It may add a new perspective at finding best conditions to favor
cooperation. Within the framework and interpretation of evolutionary graph theory given in Sec. 2, this
means looking for the best arrangement of a given number of cooperators on a given interaction graph, but
possibly also for the best interaction graph with a given number and arrangement of cooperators, or the best
combination of number, arrangement and graph. With the payoff matrix (1) and the structure coefficient
σ(pi) cooperation is favored if
σ(pi) >
c− b
a− d. (6)
Note that this condition indicates that the fixation probability of cooperation is higher than the fixation
probability of defection, but entails no statement about the exact values of the fixation probabilities them-
selves. As known for the Frucht and for the Tietze graph, for a single cooperator the structure coefficient
does not imply the exact value of the fixation probability of cooperation. For a single cooperator we have
a single value of the structure coefficient but different fixation probabilities which may vary over initial
configurations [24].
To refocus on whether or not cooperation is favored, consider, for example, the parametrization of the
payoff matrix (1) used in the seminal work of Axelrod [3], with later modifications by Nowak & Sigmund [28],
for the Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and the snowdrift (SD) game:
(
a b
c d
)
=
(
4 0
5 1
)
for PD and
(
3 1
5 0
)
for
SD. We obtain that cooperation is favored over defection if σ(pi) > 5/3 for the PD and if σ(pi) > 4/3 for
the SD game. In view of the findings given in Sec. 3, this means that 2 cooperators attain fixation on
none of the 6 graphs considered for the PD game, but on all 6 graphs for the SD game. For c(pi) = 2,
all σmax < 5/3, and all σmin > 4/3. For a single cooperator the same applied as σ = 3/2. Consequently,
for the SD game fixation of cooperation occurs for more than 2 cooperators as well. For the PD game and
c(pi) ≥ 3 cooperators, the situation is different. As σmin < 5/3 for all 6 graphs and all c(pi) for the interaction
networks considered, see Tab. 1, cooperation is never unconditionally favored, that is for all configurations
and independent of how many cooperators c(pi) ≥ 3 there are. However, except for the Franklin graph
there are configurations that favor cooperation with σ(pi) > 5/3, see Fig. 3. For instance, for the Frucht
graph and c(pi) = 3 cooperators, the configuration shown in Fig. 1(a) has σ(pi) = 1.6897 > 5/3. The same
applies to the other 2 configurations occupying the other 2 triangles of the Frucht graph. Similarly, for the
other graphs in Figs. 1 and 2 (see also the Appendix 1) as well as certain numbers of cooperators c(pi),
there are some configurations pi favoring cooperation. Comparing the graphs suggests again a difference
between the vertex–transitive graphs and those that are just regular with the 3 vertex–transitive graphs
considered more rarely favoring cooperation with the parameters of the payoff matrix given. Whether this
result is generally true for vertex–transitive graphs or an anomaly due to special properties of the truncated
tetrahedral, the Franklin and the Mo¨bius ladder graph should be addressed by future work. Thus, if we were
just to consider the 6 interaction networks listed in Tab. 1, the Frucht graph with c(pi) = 5 cooperators and
configuration pi = (1000 0000 1111) would be most favorable for cooperation as this combination of network
and configuration yields the largest value σmax = σ(1000 0000 1111) = 1.7568. Due to the symmetry of σ(pi)
with respect to c(pi) another solution is the configuration pi = (0111 1111 0000) with c(pi) = 7 and the same
σmax = σ(0111 1111 0000) = 1.7568. In other words, if we view the parameter c = 5 of the payoff matrix
of the PD game as the temptation to defect, then these 2 configurations would favor cooperation on the
Frucht graph even if the temptation gets as high as c ≤ 3σmax = 5.2704 > 5. Moreover, for the PD game
with a = 4 the reward to cooperate and d = 1 the punishment to defect, cooperation is Pareto–efficient as
a − d = 3 > 0. Thus, the 2 configurations on the Frucht graph would favor cooperation even if the value
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of the difference between reward and punishment is as low as a − d ≥ 5/σmax = 2.8461 < 3. In a similar
manner the effect of configuration and network on relations between the parameters of the payoff matrix
can be studied, for instance on risk–dominance (a+ b)/(c+ d).
Another interesting aspect and pointer to future work comes from analyzing properties of the configura-
tions with largest σ(pi). We notice that pi = (100000001111) indicates that the 5 cooperators are situated on
the overlap of the square and a triangle of the Frucht graph, while the 7 cooperators of pi = (011111110000)
are on the overlap of 2 triangles and the hexagon (cycle of length 6). These results relate to findings showing
for 3 and 4 cooperators that the largest structure coefficients σ(pi) are frequently found for the cooperators
located on triangles or squares of the evolutionary graph, see for instance Fig. 1. Naturally, if the cooper-
ators are located on these cycles, such overlaps of cycles with different lengths coincide with low values of
the cooperator path length. These results suggest the hypothesis that particularly large values of σ(pi) can
be obtained if the interaction graph possesses a certain abundance of cycles of length up to the number of
cooperators c(pi). Large values of σ(pi) appear if the cooperators are located on these cycles, particularly if
the cycles overlap, that is cycles of different lengths share vertices. Further work is needed for clarification.
This kind of discussion immediately leads to a related question, which is to design optimal conditions
of cooperation. Freezing the values of the payoff matrix (1), the design space encompasses the initial
configurations as well as the interaction networks. For games with 2 strategies and N players the number
of configurations is 2N and just considering evolutionary graphs that are regular their number grows for
k = o(
√
N) with O(NN ) [36, 43]. Thus, while for a small number of players, such as N = 12 as in the
examples discussed, and pre–selected interaction networks as in Tab. 1, a calculation of all σ(pi) can be
done, solving the design problem in general becomes numerically expensive for intermediate N and infeasible
for N getting large. For designing configurations, there are, however, some further aspects. For N → ∞,
the structure coefficients uniformly tend to σ(pi) → σ = (k + 1)/(k − 1) [11, 30]. Put differently, whether
cooperation is favored ceases to depend on which configuration the game has initially and thus solving the
design problem ceases to be particularity meaningful for the number of players N getting large. Another
aspect is the scaling of the number of configurations #c(pi) over the number of cooperators c(pi), which is
governed by Eq. (2). Accordingly, #c(pi) grows polynomially with c(pi) for all c(pi) 6= N/2, for instance by
#2 = (N−1)N/2 for c(pi) = 2 or by #3 = (N−2)(N−1)N/6 for c(pi) = 3. Only for c(pi) = N/2 and N →∞,
#N/2 grows exponentially. Thus, from a numerical point of view designing an optimal configuration for a
given number of cooperators should remain feasible, except for c(pi) = N/2, at least for N not as large as the
structure coefficients becoming uniform with σ(pi) ≈ σ ≈ (k+1)/(k−1). The results also have the potential
to inform finding interaction graphs that are better suited than a random selection to either promote or
suppress cooperation. For instance, the Franklin graph completely suppresses cooperation in the PD game
discussed above, while the Frucht graph promotes cooperation much more. The analysis suggests that
graphs with overlapping cycles of length up to the number of cooperators produce more favorable structure
coefficients than graphs with few or separate cycles. Thus, we may potentially prescribe interaction networks
with these properties and thus reduce the size of the design space.
The results given are for evolutionary game dynamics with weak selection and interaction networks mod-
eled by regular graphs. The paper closes with brief comments on going beyond regular graphs and weak
selection. Recently, an approach to assign fixation properties using coalescence times of random walks has
been proposed that is suitable for a single cooperator and any graph structure [2]. If this technique can be
extended to configurations with more than one cooperator, the approach given here would become applicable
for graphs that are not regular. It is known that the validity of extrapolating results from weak to inter-
mediate and strong selection is not always possible and depends highly on game characteristics, population
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size and spatial heterogeneity of the network [15, 26, 44], but comparison between fixation probabilities has
been shown to be fairly robust for a varying intensity of selection and a single cooperator [15]. It remains
to be seen if this is also valid for any arrangement of cooperators and defectors.
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Appendix 1
A more detailed description of the relationships between configurations pi, structure coefficients σ(pi) and
cooperator path lengths lc is presented for selected graphs.
1. The Frucht graph [11, 14, 24], which has no non–trivial symmetry. Fig. 7 (a)–(c): Configurations
with 2 cooperators (c(pi) = 2. There are #2 = 66 configurations with 2 cooperators according to Eq. (2).
Calculating the structure coefficients σ(pi) by Eq. (4) yields #σmax = 9 configurations out of these 66 that
have the maximal value of σmax = 1.5846. All these configurations have the 2 cooperators distanced by
the minimal cooperator path length lc = 1 and the 2 cooperators belonging to one of the 3 triangles of the
Frucht graph (I3, I4, I5), (I6, I7, I8) and (I9, I10, I11), see Fig. 7(a) showing the example of configuration
pi = (0011 0000 0000). The minimal cooperator path length lc = 1 alone also yields the second largest
σ(pi) = 1.5455, but lc = 1 is not sufficient for the maximal value, see Fig. 7(b) showing the configuration
pi = (1000 0000 0001). The smallest value of σmin = 1.4546 corresponds with the #σmin = 23 configurations
with largest values of lc, (21 configurations with lc = 3 and 2 configurations with lc = 4), see the example
of pi = (0010 0000 1000) with lc = 4 in Fig. 7(c). Over all configurations with c(pi) = 2, there are #σ = 5
different values of σ(pi). Fig. 7 (d)–(f): Configurations with 3 cooperators (c(pi) = 3). The largest value
σmax = 1.6897 is obtained for #σmax = 3 configurations out of the #3 = 220. Configurations maximizing
σ(pi) are characterized by the minimal lc such that the cooperators are occupying the 3 triangle of Frucht
graph, see Fig. 7(d) showing the example pi = (0011 1000 0000) which has lc = 1 according to Eq. (5)
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with individual path lengths d = (d34, d35, d45) = (1, 1, 1). Small values of σ are obtained for large values
of lc. There are 2 configurations with the largest value lc = 3 for which σ(pi) = 1.4270 (the second
smallest value) is obtained for individual path lengths between cooperators d = (d57, d5 10, d7 10) = (2, 4, 3),
Fig.7(e), while the smallest value of σmin = 1.4000 belongs to the configuration pi = (0001 0010 0100) with
d = (d47, d4 10, d7 10) = (3, 3, 3), Fig. 7(f). Over all configurations with c(pi) = 3, there are #σ = 14 different
values of σ(pi).
2. The truncated tetrahedral graph [35], which is vertex–transitive and square free. Fig. 8(a)–(c):
Configurations with 2 cooperators (c(pi) = 2). There are #σmax = 12 out of 66 configurations that have
the maximal σmax = 1.5846, all of which have the minimal lc = 1 and belong to one of the 4 triangles of
the truncated tetrahedral graph (I1, I2, I3), (I4, I5, I6), (I7, I8, I9) and (I10, I11, I12), see Fig. 8(a) showing
the example of configuration pi = (0110 0000 0000). As for the Frucht graph (Fig. 7), the minimal lc = 1
alone also yields the second highest value σ(pi) = 1.5455, see Fig. 8(b). There are 24 configurations with
the maximal lc = 3 which all give the smallest value of σmin = 1.4546, see Fig. 8(c). Over all configurations
with c(pi) = 2, there are #σ = 4 different values of σ(pi). Fig. 8(d)–(f): Configurations with 3 cooperators
(c(pi) = 3). The largest value σmax = 1.6897 is obtained for 4 out of 220 configurations, each configuration
representing one of the 4 triangles of the graph, see the example pi = (1110 0000 0000) in Fig. 8(d). The
smallest value σmin = 1.4000 is obtained for the 4 configurations with lc = 3, see Figs.8(e) and (f) with the
examples pi = (1000 1000 1000) and pi = (0001 0001 0001). There are #σ = 10 different values of σ(pi) with
c(pi) = 3.
3. The Franklin graph [12], which is vertex–transitive and triangle free. Fig. 9(a)–(b): Configurations
with 2 cooperators (c(pi) = 2). There are #σmax = 18 out of 66 configurations that have the maximal
value σmax = 1.5455, all of these (and only these) configurations have the minimal lc = 1, see Fig. 9(a).
Note that the maximal structure coefficient σ(pi) is smaller than for the Frucht and truncated tetrahedral
graph (Figs. 7 and 8), which is σmax = 1.5846 obtained for configurations within a triangle of the graph.
The Franklin graph is triangle free and only the second highest value of σ(pi) is obtained. The minimal
value of σmin = 1.4546 is obtained for all 18 configurations with the maximal lc = 3, Fig. 9(a) with
pi = (1001 0000 0000). There are #σ = 4 different values of σ(pi). Fig. 9(c)–(f): Configurations with 3
cooperators. The maximal value of σmax) = 1.5909 is obtained for 12 out of 220 configurations, all have
the minimal lc = 4/3 and additionally belong to one of the 3 squares of the Franklin graph, (I1, I2, I7, I8),
(I3, I4, I9, I10), (I5, I6, I11, I12), see Fig. 9(c). The minimal lc = 4/3 in itself only yields the second largest
σ(pi) = 1.5618, Fig. 9(d). The minimal value of σmin = 1.4270 is obtained for 24 configurations with the
largest value of lc = 8/3 and not 2 out of 3 cooperators belonging to the same square, Fig. 9(e). However, if
lc = 8/3 and 2 of the cooperators belong to the same square of the graph, we get the second smallest value
σ(pi) = 1.4546, Fig. 9(f). In total, there are #σ = 8 different values of σ(pi).
4. Configurations pi, structure coefficients σ(pi) and cooperator path lengths lc for 4 cooperators (c(pi) =
4). There are #4 = 495 configurations with c(pi) = 4. The maximal structure coefficient σmax = 1.7059 for
the Frucht graph is obtained for 2 configurations, both with the minimal value lc = 4/3 and additionally
overlapping a triangle and the square of the Frucht graph, (I1, I10, I11, I12), see Fig. 10(a) for the example
pi = (1000 0000 1110), the other configuration is pi = (0000 0000 1111). For the truncated tetrahedral graph,
the maximal σmax = 1.6796 is obtained for all the 12 configurations with the minimal lc = 4/3, Fig. 10(b).
The Franklin graph has 3 configurations with maximal σmax = 1.6539, they have minimal lc = 4/3 and each
form one of the 3 squares of the graph, Fig. 10(c). The smallest values of σ(pi) are obtained as follows. For
the Frucht graph there are 23 configurations with the smallest value σmin = 1.4231, all with large values of
lc, (1 configurations with lc = 8/3, 10 configurations with lc = 5/2 and 12 configurations with lc = 7/3), see
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Figure 7: Configurations pi, structure coefficients σ(pi) and cooperator path lengths lc for the Frucht graph [11, 14, 24],
which has no non–trivial symmetry. (a)–(c): Configurations with 2 cooperators (c(pi) = 2). (d)–(f): Configurations
with 3 cooperators (c(pi) = 3).
the example of pi = (0000 1010 0101) with lc = 8/3 in Fig. 10(d). However, there are 3 more configurations
with the highest values lc = 8/3 that have larger values of σ(pi), but for these the individual path lengths
between cooperators is widely distributed, compare to Fig.7(e) and (f). For the truncated tetrahedral graph,
there are 30 configurations with the smallest value σmin = 1.4231 with the seconds largest value lc = 7/3,
see the example pi = (1001 0010 0100) in Fig. 10(e). However, there are also 24 configurations with the
largest value lc = 5/2 that have the second smallest value σ(pi) = 1.4340. For the Franklin graph, there are
15 configurations with the smallest value σmin = 1.4231, 3 of them with the largest value lc = 8/3 and the
remaining with the second largest lc = 5/2, see the example pi(0100 1001 0010) in Fig. 10(f).
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Figure 8: Configurations pi, structure coefficients σ(pi) and cooperator path lengths lc for the truncated tetrahedral
graph [35], which is vertex–transitive and square free. (a)–(c): Configurations with 2 cooperators (c(pi) = 2). (d)–(f):
Configurations with 3 cooperators (c(pi) = 3).
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Figure 9: Configurations pi, structure coefficients σ(pi) and cooperator path lengths lc for the Franklin graph [12], which
is vertex–transitive and triangle free. (a)–(b): Configurations with 2 cooperators (c(pi) = 2). (c)–(f): Configurations
with 3 cooperators.
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Figure 10: Configurations pi, structure coefficients σ(pi) and cooperator path lengths lc for 4 cooperators (c(pi) = 4).
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